

~~SENSITIVE~~

CIA/SAVA /WVIND 700321



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 21 March 1970


NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.

For the President Only


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SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1970



weekly average
for each month

OCTOBER 1969 - MARCH 1970

weekly data as reported, Jan-Feb-Mar
weekly average per month, Oct-Dec



US BATTLE DEATHS

increased to 110 from last week's 101.





SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS

declined to 244 from last week's 262. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than figures released to the press by the GVN.





INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE

numbered four four-digit groups, four small "QL" groups, and one small "H" group. Acceptance of a "gap-fill" group raises the estimate for the week to over 2,200. Since 23 October, some 50,500 to 52,000 have entered the pipeline.





ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS

rose sharply to 658 from last week's relatively low 526.



ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION

remained constant at 2,301 compared to last week's 2,305.



SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS

as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by RVN forces increased again to 56% from the previous week's 53%.

Dotted line shows current average for March 1970

Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

Although there was a sharp rise in enemy initiated activity during the week, enemy casualties remained at the same level of the previous week (about 2,300). Enemy activity was largely confined to small-scale attacks with a surge in terrorist activity in Saigon and environs. Saigon security officials had already pretty well pulled the teeth of a threatened major terror campaign in the city through a combination of good police and intelligence work.

A document captured in Hau Nghia Province, dated 11 March 1970, from the Headquarters of Sub Region 2 (SR-2 is one of the major Communist commands in the Saigon area) reinforces other documentary material which points to the need for a lower Communist military profile. The modus operandi for lowering the military presence in SR-2, according to the document, has been to break up some main force battalions and assign them to Viet Cong districts in order to operate as small, local force detachments. Small-scale operations, which will not provoke massive Allied reactions or disturb the local populace, apparently are the order of the day. The document also contains instructions for the penetration or development of organizations with "legal" status under whose cover it will be safe for the Communists to work. Loyal government officials are to be "neutralized" thereby enabling the Communists to use intimidated or sympathetic officials to control the local population and government machinery.

Enemy Infiltration

During the past week, four four-digit groups and five small specialist groups were detected and one "gap-fill" was accepted. These groups total 2,256 personnel and raise the estimate of infiltrators entering the pipeline for March to some 7,000 and the estimate since 23 October 1969 to 50,500 to 52,000 personnel. Overall, 68 four-digit groups have been detected in North Vietnam, 28 detected in Laos, and 10 are "gap-fills."

The relatively low level of infiltration input apparently will continue as recent intercepts forecast that the Communists plan to dispatch troops into the infiltration pipeline at a rate of one group a day from at least 25 March to 2 April. This schedule may be disrupted as the influenza epidemic which appeared to be on the wane in the Laotian Panhandle is on the rise again in North Vietnam, with the new outbreak reportedly more serious than the earlier one.

25X1B

Other Major Developments

On 20 March, the South Vietnamese mounted a large-scale ground and air operation jointly with the Cambodians against Communist bases and staging areas just inside Cambodia, adjacent to the Delta. The decision by the Joint General Staff to conduct the operation was precipitated by a request from the local Cambodian commander. The South Vietnamese claim to have inflicted extensive damage to Communist installations. ARVN losses were 22 KIA, while enemy losses were put at 212. President Thieu reportedly ordered the operation stopped on 22 March because of the uncertain political situation in Phnom Penh. The ARVN commander has been instructed to deny that the border was crossed and not to provide any details to Americans. No American advisors participated in this operation.

Senior South Vietnamese officials privately view the overthrow of Sihanouk with exhilaration and optimism, but they have been instructed by President Thieu to limit their public comments to expressions of support for Cambodian neutrality and hopes for better relations. The Thieu Government probably calculates that at a minimum the Cambodians will now be less likely to connive in the flow of arms and rice to the Communists and that there will be increased Cambodian harassment of the Communist forces. Thieu has said that either true Cambodian neutrality, or a strong anti-Communist stance by the new Cambodian leadership would serve GVN interests. He believes that if the Cambodians make the Communist military position in Cambodia untenable by cutting off supplies and bombing the bases, it would quickly lead to serious negotiations in Paris.

With North Vietnamese Army (NVA) elements within six kilometers of the Royal Lao Government (RLG) guerrilla base at Long Tieng, the Lao generals have decided to appeal to United States officials for more air support including B-52 raids on the NVA logistical terminal at Ban Ban. Meanwhile, the Lao Patriotic Front (NLHS) representative, Colonel Pradith Thiengtham, has arrived in Vientiane and presented the promised message from NLHS chief Souphanouvong to Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, which reportedly adds nothing to the previously published Communist five-point settlement plan for Laos. At Long Tieng itself, the unprecedented cooperation among Lao regional commanders has increased the defending force to over 3,000 plus a Thai artillery unit. Additional T-28 support is now available from a recently completed facility at Muong Kassy.

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